Digital Society, Muhammadiyah, and Islamism in the Post 2024 Indonesian General Election

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This article aims to analyses the use of electronic means such as the internet, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram with Islamic themes as a form of Islamism used in the 2014, 2019 and 2024 political campaigns to win the presidential and vice-presidential election battle in Indonesia. This article discusses the literature that shows how the networks and participation of Muslim citizens involved in the presidential election as a form of citizen participation (civil society) so that it appears the political articulation of Muslims using Islamic themes. The analysis in this article shows that the participation of Muslim citizens indirectly shows the existence of the power of Islamism in social media discursive with other Muslim citizens, as well as non-Muslim citizens who also participated in the 2014-2019-2024 election political battle. All of that shows that netizens have an 'emotional closeness' to the presidential-vice presidential candidate pair by using religious sentiments and networks between netizens who participate in politics as a form of netizens' political participation in the Digital Society era. The article uses the method of searching and describing data from social media databases.

Keywords: Citizen participation, digital era, emotional network, Islamism, social media.

Currently it is said to be entering the digital era. An era where the use of communication technology dominates society in the world, including Indonesia. Digital user community as part of everyday life. This of course causes changes in many social events, such as politics, which are activities that consume the people of Indonesia and the world the most (Van Dijk 2014). This is because there are many assumptions that politics is a social activity that costs a lot, is full of tricks, takes a lot of victims and does not place women on an equal footing with men. Because of this, politics gives the impression of a "negative social activity" and is full of the underworld such as bandits and the mafia (Kenawas 2015: 58). This is because political activity is full of intrigue and "money politics" between the elite and businessmen and politicians and the people. There are even "political brokers" between political elites and local political elites by using the majority religion (Aspinall 2014: 545).

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Digital society in its history did not appear suddenly but as part of the social process of an agrarian society towards an industrial society and towards a post-industrial society which no longer relies on things that are mechanical in nature and the strength of human or animal power, even machine power with strong explosives but software that is a program (Piccone 2018:29). Thus, digital society can be said to be a social transformation from traditional to industrial and post-industrial. Digital society is a continuation of the society we used to know as a traditional (agrarian) and industrial society which was based on machine power (Sgueo 2020). Digital society as a form of "cyberspace" society can also create social class differences because of access to information obtained in each region or country (Van Dijk 2012: 49).

In relation to industrial and post-industrial society, there is also a growing and developing political phenomenon that is "formalized religion" in the public sphere known as Islamism as a form of politics that wishes to present "religious law" for common interests (Buehler 2016: 157). This kind of politics is said to be an activity called Islamism which emphasizes the existence of formal forms of using Islamic attributes in many domains of social life. However, the realm of social life that gets the most influence or is "used" by those who are dominant in using formalized politics is the political dimension (Buehler 2009: 51). The politics of public space eventually becomes a kind of "political formalization of Islam" as a real form of Islamism (Buehler 2018: 157).

The political conditions that lead to "formalization of Islamic law" can be seen because Indonesia as a country has a total Muslim population of 87% of the total population of Indonesia, which ranges from 270-276 million people. Where Muslims in Indonesia are most of the population (Buehler 2013). Thus, all Indonesian political parties and political activists, especially Islamic politicians and Islamic parties are competing to try to gain the votes of Muslims in every election, including the 2024 elections. Therefore, the 2024 election can be said to be a politics that 'utilizes the power of Muslims' as a vote banker. This is because all the presidential and vice-presidential candidates come from among Muslims, both traditionalist and modernist Muslims.

Muhammadiyah, as an Islamic organization that has a very large congregation and social activities, is expected to make a positive contribution in fostering a civilized, democratic tradition within the framework of moderate Islamic principles in society both at home and abroad. Muhammadiyah carries out its political activities in a more dignified national politics, upholding humanity, and civility. Muhammadiyah carries out its political activities in national politics that are more dignified, uphold humanity, and civilization. Therefore, Muhammadiyah is an Islamic organization that is considered important if it is able to take part in national political activities after the 2024 elections (Latief & Nashir 2020; Nashir, Qodir 2019a).

The 2024 elections that have taken place can be said to be an election full of various 'political surprises' as well as 'political uproar'. Gibran Rakabuming Raka's running mate with Prabowo Subianto is a very clear form of uproar, because the Constitutional Court changed the minimum age requirement for Vice Presidential Candidates from 40 years old to less than 40 years old. In addition, there is a tendency to 'utilize religious identity', especially the religion adhered to by the majority Muslim population against fellow Muslims because of the sentiment of support for the candidate being promoted. Political practices in 2024 are still dominated by 'emotional politics', i.e. choosing a presidential-vice presidential candidate pair based on emotional attachment to the candidate, rather than on rational choices that can lead to political openness and democratic civilization expected by many social scientists.

Research Objectives

There are three objectives of this research, firstly, to analyze the factors that cause the tendency among Indonesians to use digital (electronic) means in conducting election campaigns, implementation, and calculation of election results. Second, to analyze the factors that cause the rise of Islamist trends in Indonesia in the 2024 elections as well as the impacts that occur after the 2024 elections in Indonesia. Third, to analyze Muhammadiyah's roles in building a democratic tradition

that is civilized and just in accordance with the principles of moderate Islam which is the main pillar of Muhammadiyah's national politics amid Indonesian Islamic society

Theoretical Framework

This research uses a theoretical approach on digital democracy to describe the digital society as well as the theory of the Islamist movement that developed on Indonesian soil during the 2019, 2024 and post-2024 elections which showed the rise of Islamist sentiment in society which was driven by using social media and electronic media as a sentiment generator. Indonesian society, which has Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates at that time, is said to represent three forces of society, Islamists, professionals and nationalists. With the two theoretical approaches used, it is expected to explain and analyze issues related to digital democracy and Islamism that are happening in Indonesia during and after the 2024 elections.

Digital society refers to a society that is very active in using electronic means in communicating so that "space and time" are no longer a barrier in communicating between citizens in various parts of the country. Digital society is thus one of the characteristics of "electronic media users" in communicating between citizens (Van Dijk, 2014:9). People who are active in utilizing electronic communications are post-industrial societies since the development of the internet and various social media such as Instagram, Facebook, Linkedin, and email. After the emergence of these electronic means, the community then switched to communication tools that were faster, efficient, and easy to change at any time according to the needs of the community(Van Dijk 2009: 10).

Whereas Islamism is a community activity that leads to a desire to make the state or government more oriented towards Islamic "activities" such as Regional Regulations like Islamic Regulation (Perda Syariat) related to halal drinks and food, halal tourism, halal hotels, and regulations on reading and writing al- Qur'an (Buehler 1998). In short, it can be said that what is called Islamism is a political activity of Muslims who prioritize Islamic "symbols" in the public sphere rather than matters of an Islamic substance. Islamism is the use of Islamic symbols in politics by slightly forgetting the substance of Islamic norms (Bayat 2005: 891). To encourage Islamism activities, initiators and supporters carry out activities that are connected between provinces, between elites, and politicians and entrepreneurs with the aim of gaining political support in the field (Arifianto 2020).

Digital Society and Digital Democracy

Digital society is a condition of people who are very familiar with the world of communication technology as part of everyday life. There isn't a day without technology involved. Therefore, humans in the technological era can be said to be humans and society who depend on information technology, even though there are negative impacts from information that can easily be obtained (Ahlstrom 2016 23; Arana-Catania 2021). In fact, society in the technological era is a society with very high pressure and risk, because communication technology, especially using social media, is a "nesting place for "social ghosts" that users cannot control as evil media (Papacharissi 2013: 4).

The development of a digital society, which has now penetrated the world of electoral politics, such as elections held in Indonesia every five years, such as presidential and vice-presidential elections and regional head elections, cannot be considered simple. Presidential elections and regional head elections use quick counts, due to the use of electronic means, so they no longer take too long (Nemitz 2018 :8). The calculation becomes efficient, even though it gives a negative record, because if at the time of counting the server or electronic signals as part of information technology experience congestion (Fioriglio 2019). However, in its development, the use of information technology facilities in the implementation of elections is unavoidable in Indonesia. This is an era where people prefer digital over manual for almost all matters.

Of course, there are other positive and negative sides of using communication technology facilities in the implementation of Indonesian elections. One positive side is that it is effective and efficient in terms of vote counting time, unlike when using manual counting, humans count the ballots one by one because of the voting (York 2018:30). Meanwhile, one of the negative dimensions is that control over the misuse of tools by Election executors or committees is almost impossible for those who do not serve as election executors because they do not directly deal with the vote counting tools. One of them is if there is manipulation of the number of ballots for the benefit of the election winner. Of course, the implementation and voters do not intend to manipulate votes, but the negative elements of digital democracy are of course the responsibility of all parties to avoid them (Arana-Catania 2021).

But apart from the negative dimensions of the use of information technology facilities in the era of digital society, it can be said that digital democracy will one day be the choice of the world community, including Indonesia, with a large enough population and a very large number of provinces and a very wide national territory(Papacharissi, 2013:3; Petros Iosifidis and Nicholas Nicoli, 2021). By using communication technology facilities, digital democracy can be said to be the most profitable political tool, especially for people who have good access to communication technology. Meanwhile, people who lack communication technology skills in the digital democracy era will eventually become a society that is "left behind in digital democracy". Thus, digital society will eventually use digital democracy as a choice for implementing elections in the future (Wehsener 2022).

The growth of digital democracy has been carried out in various European countries such as England, Sweden, Norway, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Australia, and Malaysia. In these countries, the public elects a candidate for Prime Minister through electronic means provided by the election organizing committee in each province (Simon 2017: 60). People don't even need to come to the polling place, they just need to use the election application that has been provided by the committee so that they can vote from each person's home or office or place of work. Therefore, people can easily vote without wasting much time going to the polls. The use of electronic means in the implementation of elections is an election that can be said to be effective, efficient and makes it easier for the community (Sgueo 2020). That is the phenomenon of digital society and digital democracy that has become an option in several countries. Speeding up the election process and its calculation. Indonesia also followed digital democracy in the 2024 elections that have passed.

Islamism Sentiment

Sentiment Islamism occurs due to encouragement from political elites and Muslim political activists who wish to become symbols of Islam in the country as a whole or in part in the state system. This kind of enthusiasm has started since the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979 when the Reza Pahlavi regime was overthrown by Mullahs who were highly respected throughout Iran(Mozaffari 2007: 18). At that time, Mullahs like Imam Khomeini and Murtadha Motahari, with the support of Iranian scholars and people, demonstrated to overthrow the authoritarian Pahlavi regime. Apart from that, there was also the overthrow of Hosni Moubarak in Egypt by the Islamist group because they considered Hosni Moubarak to lead Egypt in a secular way. After various incidents, Islamism continues to run as in Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, and Afghanistan until now(Sakai & Fauzia 2014).

The development of Islamism seems to have also occurred in Indonesia. In the 2014, 2019, 2024 elections as well as regional head elections in several provinces and districts, the use of Islamic symbols has become an integral part of electoral politics. Presidential candidates in the 2014, 2019 and 2024 elections used Islamic symbols to bring down their political opponents (Nurdin 2019). Likewise, regional head elections in several provinces also use the power of Islamic symbols to bring down their political opponents. In fact, Islamic symbols are used by political parties that are not directly affiliated with Islam, such as PKS and PPP, but the Gerindra Party, Democratic Party and PDIP

Perjuangan. Both political parties affiliated with Islam and not use Islamic symbols to gain political support from the majority Muslim community, such as in West Nusa Tenggara, West Java, East Java, West Sumatra, South Kalimantan and DKI Jakarta.

The interesting about the use of Islamic symbols in the electoral political process is that people are eroded by various kinds of expressions and videos that are often uploaded by the success team of presidential candidates and regional head pairs, so that society becomes socially segregated, especially on social media and society. Urban social media users (Ikhwan 2018). Meanwhile, in rural communities who are not users of social media, the cases of the 2014, 2019 and 2024 presidential elections, as well as the 2014 and 2019 regional head elections, did not cause social segregation. This is because they are "free from the political burden of social media". Islamic social sentiment can be said to occur in urban community groups who use massive and emotional social media (Hamayotsu 2018: 10). Meanwhile, in rural communities who do not use social media, they are not infected with the disease "religious social sentiment".

The use of Islamic sentiments is understandable because Indonesia is predominantly Muslim. Even if it does not mean that the use of Islamic sentiments can be justified, because by using Islamic sentiments, it means those who are not Muslim are outside the "group of Muslims who are the target of the campaign" (Bazzi 2020). Even though it is known that Indonesia is not only inhabited by Muslims. Indonesia is a country not based on a particular religion as proclaimed by our founding father and mother at the time of independence (Nurlinah 2018). Especially if by using Islamic sentiment with the aim of eliminating non-Islamic groups or groups that are not supporters of Islamists. Such a thing, of course, cannot be said to be a just and civilized democratic process without discriminating between "citizens political rights"(Nurdin 2019: 29).

Islamism seems to continue to thrive today in Indonesia in the regional head elections and in the 2014 and 2024 presidential elections because the presidential candidates, as mentioned above, represent three groups of people. Therefore, if not properly anticipated, the possibility of social segregation due to the impact of the use of social media in building Islamic sentiment will be even stronger after the 2024 presidential election (Ropi 2010: 282). This direction has already begun to appear in the expressions of Islamic and non-Islamic sentiments directed at the presidential candidates that surfaced during the campaign. Only in the end, the power of Islamic sentiment was not able to win the presidential election in 2024, in fact it can be said to be the source of defeat of candidates who use the sentiment of Islamism, namely Anies-Muhaimin proved to lose to Prabowo-Gibran.

Religious Networking

After using Islamic sentiments in political battles such as presidential elections and regional head elections, another thing that is of concern is the use of religious (Islamic) networks as vehicles for winning in battles. The use of Islamic groups with all their attributes is considered capable of putting pressure on political opponents who do not use religious vehicles in elections (Ahyar 2017). Conservatism groups are often used by those who like to use the majority religion as a driving force to win the election battle. However, not all religious groups can be "tamed" to become vote prospectors in elections, so groups that do not use religious symbols always lose the battle (Abdullah 2019).

In the case of the 2014 and 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections, the support groups that used Islamic attributes even suffered defeat from groups that did not use Islamic attributes. In the 2014 election, Prabowo Subiyanto, who was partnered with Hatta Rajasa, lost to the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla pair. Meanwhile, in the 2019 elections, Prabowo, who was partnered with Shandiaga Uno, also lost to the Jokowi-Ma'ruf. It is known that the Prabowo-Hatta and Prabowo-Shandi were pairs that used Islamic attributes to gain votes, but in the end, they lost to Jokowi-JK and Jokowi-Ma'ruf who did not use Islamic attributes in the two elections (Bourchier 2019: 714). Meanwhile, in the 2024

elections, Prabowo-Gibran, who did not use Islamic attributes and symbols, won the battle from Anies-Muhaimin, who used Islamic attributes and symbols.

Therefore, it is interesting to pay attention to the context of the Indonesian elections in 2024. Where a presidential-presidential candidate pair that uses Islamic attributes to gain votes, even though in the previous two elections they lost. In the 2024 elections, it turns out that efforts to use Islamic attributes and sources will continue, thus repeating the defeat as in the previous elections. Moreover, in the 2024 elections, all presidential and vice-presidential candidates were figures close to Islam in Indonesia (Mietzner 2018). Thus, it can be said that using Islamic attributes by utilizing networks of 'established' and conservative Islamic organizations, continues to prolong religious sentiments that result in social segregation in social media spaces (Hadiz 2020 :18). The facts on the ground are not necessarily able to win the battle from those who do not use Islamic attributes and symbols. This can be said to be the success of Civil Islam Indonesia.

In addition, the strength of religious networks only be in urban areas that have strong social media access. Whereas in rural areas where access to social media is not easy, the power of religious networks do not have much effect on the votes for the 2024 election. It's just that "there is excessive fear" of the use of the power of religious networks in winning the 2024 elections, by using the existing religious networks in Indonesia, especially the Islamic network (Mujani 2003). The fear over the use of Islamic networks is understandable because it often gives rise to social hatreds that are uploaded on social media in a vulgar manner. We are grateful that the use of Islamic attributes and symbols did not win the 2024 elections so that the fear does not continue in the community.

Muhammadiyah in politics Indonesia

Muhammadiyah as an Islamic organization has been established for quite a long time (18 November 1912) in Yogyakarta by KH. Ahmad Dahlan in Kauman village. To date, Muhammadiyah has more than 25 million followers throughout Indonesia. Muhammadiyah also has congregations abroad as Muhammadiyah Overseas Branches such as in Malaysia. Muhammadiyah Overseas Branches are not only in Malaysia, but also in Australia, America, Europe, and the Middle East. Therefore, Muhammadiyah can be said to be an organization that spans several countries (Burhani 2018: 444). This is the importance of Muhammadiyah with its very large congregation both in Indonesia and abroad.

Although Muhammadiyah is in Indonesia or abroad, it still has the same vision, mission, and movement to develop society in the national political movement, humanity, and advocacy for the poor. This is a commonality that cannot be bargained for by Muhammadiyah members to become Muhammadiyah. In politics, Muhammadiyah is not involved in party political practices that tend to be partisan, not neutral and tend to direct to one pair of presidential-vice presidential candidates. Muhammadiyah has decided not to be part of any political party. This is Muhammadiyah's neutral political stance from the central level to the branch level (Nashir 2019b).

Thus, Muhammadiyah in Indonesia and other country are not allowed to get involved in practical politics using or on behalf of the organization. However, Muhammadiyah does not prohibit its citizens from getting involved in party politics without using organizational attributes or symbols. Muhammadiyah believes this is part of the political freedom of Muhammadiyah citizens, without having to use organizational attributes or symbols (Nashir 2019). This kind of political freedom is because Muhammadiyah members belong to the many political parties in Indonesia. Anyone who is in a political party must carry the vision, mission, and movement of Muhammadiyah without having to slip into politics that do not respect humanity and uphold justice in society (Qodir 2021).

Muhammadiyah in the recently held electoral politics of 2024 on 14 April in Indonesia, as a socio-religious organization, does not belong to any political party. Muhammadiyah also does not support any of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Therefore, Muhammadiyah has a neutral position, but is not anti-electoral politics, because Muhammadiyah also encourages its

citizens to become participants in the President-Vice Presidential Election and the election of legislative members to determine the better direction of Indonesia in the future. Muhammadiyah's commitment to politics is national politics, not partisan like political parties. Muhammadiyah hopes always that the elections will run honestly and fairly.

To conclude after describing the existence of social conditions and Islamism in Indonesia in the 2014, 2019 and 2024 elections, it can be said that Indonesian society cannot be separated from the use of electronic media, especially social media in national politics and local politics. The use of social media and electronic media is mainly carried out among urban communities that have easy access to information and electronics. Meanwhile, in rural communities the use of social media is not widely practiced due to the difficulty of getting access to information through the internet network.

In addition, social media can also be said to influence urban communities that actively use social media. Especially supporters who have 'Islamic sentiments' in accordance with presidential and regional head candidates. Meanwhile, for people who do not have 'Islamic sentiments', social media does not affect their attitudes and actions in making choices. Instead, it strengthens solidarity to not vote for those who use 'Islamic sentiment'. Such a thing was proven in the 2024 elections, where the President-Vice President that did not use Islamic sentiment won the electoral election.

In the 2024 election, Islamic sentiment will continue to be exploited by utilizing social media and other digital media to gain votes from Muslims. Islamic networks are also used in every province throughout Indonesia, but they are unable to gain votes from candidates to win the battle. In fact, the use of Islamic sentiments and Islamic networks worsened the vote share of candidates running in the 2024 elections, so that the Anies-Muhaimin pair lost to Prabowo-Gibran.

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