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**CROSS-BORDER POSTS (PLBN)
AS BORDER SECURITY
MANAGEMENT BETWEEN
INDONESIA'S KALIMANTAN
AND MALAYSIA'S SARAWAK**

FAUZAN



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Cross-Border Posts (PLBN) as Border Security Management between Indonesia's Kalimantan and Malaysia's Sarawak

Fauzan is Lecturer and Head of Diplomacy Laboratory, the Department of International Relations, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional "Veteran" Yogyakarta, as well as Associate Fellow at the Asian Institute of International Affairs and Diplomacy (AIAD), School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia .

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Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM Bangi Selangor Darul Ehsan
Tel: +603-8921 3949/3782
E-mail: pghikmas@ukm.edu.my
website: www.ukm.my/ikmas/



ukm.my/ikmas

ABSTRACT

As Indonesia shares land borders with Malaysia, Timor Leste, and Papua New Guinea, it faces numerous cross-border security challenges. Efficient and effective control of borders is one of the factors that influences socio-economic development. On one hand, border posts play an important role in facilitating the safe movement of people and goods, which results in vast economic opportunities through trade and tourism. On the other, strict border controls is also crucial to protect Indonesia from potential threats to its national security from such illegal activities as smuggling and subversive trespassing. To address security concerns at the border areas, the Indonesian government has built land border posts (PLBNs) to facilitate border crossing with neighbouring countries. Along the border between West Kalimantan and Sarawak, Malaysia, three crossings have been built: PLBN Aruk, PLBN Entikong, and PLBN Badau. This paper discusses the development and challenges of PLBNs along the West Kalimantan border. The paper also analyzes how the establishment of PLBNs have affected the development and dynamics of border security. The study argues that the construction of PLBN have contributed significantly to service for and control of border crossers. But PLBNs have not been able to reduce illegal activities in the border areas. Illegal border crossings using what are commonly referred to as “rat paths” continue and have even increased.

Keywords: Limology, Border Security Management, Cross-border Post, *Jalur Tikus*, Kalimantan

Introduction

The land border between Indonesia and Malaysia on the island of Kalimantan is approximately 2,040 km long (BNPP, 2015), stretching from Temajuk village, Sambas, West Kalimantan to Sei Pancang village, Sebatik, North Kalimantan. Three provinces, namely West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan and North Kalimantan, border Sarawak and Sabah. There are eight border districts spreading across the three provinces, namely: Sambas, Bengkayang, Sanggau, Sintang and Kapuas Hulu (West Kalimantan); Mahakam Ulu (East Kalimantan); and Malinau, Nunukan (North Kalimantan).

Along the Kalimantan border with Sarawak and Sabah, nine integrated cross-border posts (*Pos Lintas Batas Negara*, PLBN) are being built. Three have been operational since the end of 2016, namely PLBN Entikong (Sanggau), PLBN Aruk (Sambas) and PLBN Badau (Kapuas Hulu). Meanwhile, PLBN Jagoi Babang (Bengkayang) and PLBN Sei Kelik (Sintang) are not yet officially operational. Meanwhile, in the North Kalimantan region, four PLBNs are being built, namely PLBN Sei Nyamuk (Sebatik, Nunukan), PLBN Labang (Nunukan), PLBN Long Midang (Nunukan) and PLBN Long Nawang (Malinau). These PLBNs will function as check points for border crossers heading to Sarawak and Sabah and vice versa. The PLBNs that are being built and those that are operational will link Indonesian Kalimantan, the East Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah, namely, Aruk-Biawak, Jagoi Babang-Serikin, Entikong-Tebedu, Sei Kelik-Batu Lintang, Badau-Lubok Antu, Long Nawang-Long Busang, Long Midang-Ba'kelalan, Labang-Bantul, and Sei Nyamuk-Tawau (BNPP, 2022).

The border between West Kalimantan (Indonesia) and Sarawak (Malaysia) is 976 kilometres long. On the Indonesian side of the border, there are 98 villages, five districts (Sambas, Bengkayang, Sanggau, Sintang and Kapuas Hulu), and 14 sub-districts. Along the land border, the two countries have agreed on official crossing points consisting of 12 traditional border crossing posts (PLB) and three state border crossing posts (PLBN). Traditional PLBs are managed by the Directorate General of Immigration, Ministry of Law and Human Rights and services are provided for border crossers using cross-border passes, in accordance with the Border-Cross Agreement (Sindonews, 2020). The three PLBNs are managed by the National Agency for Border Management (*Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan*, BNPP) to serve the crossing of people, goods and vehicles with such

travel documents as passports and cross-border passes. The people who live around the border between Malaysia and Indonesia use border passes (Malaysia) and cross-border passes (Indonesia). Both passes are valid only for residents of the border areas, and movement is limited to the border areas visited.

At the border, there are several problems related to security threats and border management. (1) Supervision is weak in the border areas. (2) People (and goods) still use numerous illegal cross-border routes to pass through. (3) Cooperation has not been optimal among the relevant institutions and law enforcement officers when dealing with cross-border crimes. (4) Personnel, facilities and infrastructure to prevent cross-border crimes are limited (5) There is lack of optimal cooperation among neighboring countries in monitoring and preventing transnational crimes (BNPP, 2021).

Border security management is an indicator of a country's strength or weakness. Effective and efficient border security management is a prerequisite for creating a strong and sovereign state. There are not only territorial and political aspects but also social, cultural and economic aspects of the Indonesia-Malaysia land border area (Zulkarnain & Roisah, 2018). In this land border area, daily interactions occur between Indonesians and Malaysians people. The problems that occur in border areas are the rise of such cross-border crimes as goods smuggling, human trafficking, illegal logging, drugs trafficking, and so on. These transnational crimes are not only legally problematic, but also detrimental to Indonesia's economy and weakens its sovereignty. This paper aims to discuss the development and challenges of the PLBNs at the West Kalimantan border post and analyze how the establishment of PLBNs has influenced the development and dynamics of border security.

Scope and Methodology

This research uses primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected through field observations at the PLBN Aruk (Sambas), PLBN Entikong (Sanggau) and PLBN Badau (Kapuas Hulu), and the *jalur tikus* or rat path in Jagoi Babang (Bengkayang), as well as analyses of official documents. Secondary data were collected through books and magazines as well as internet news.

The data help in the analysis of s problems and threats to land border security in West Kalimantan-Sarawak through the PLBNs and rat routes.

This study focuses on data from 2017 to 2022. It analyzes the pertinent documents and regulations of the BNPP, Immigration, Customs, Quarantine, Police, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI) and Ministry of Defense. This analysis is important as it enhances understanding of how the establishment of official PLBNs have affected the development and dynamics of border security, especially on the West Kalimantan and Sarawak border.

Border Security Management

A border, a central concept of nation-states, is a political line that separates the territory of one country from that of another, where a country has full sovereignty to develop and implement policies and enforce laws over its territory (Andreas, 2003). Therefore, borders define a country's legal and geographical framework. Borders also connect one country with other countries, where easy and effective connections influence a country's socio-economic development. Thus, implementing strict border controls is important because it protects society and state security.

In the context of economic development, borders also play a very important role as cross-border posts (PLBN) function as gateways between countries, providing wider economic opportunities through trade, tourism and foreign investment activities. In the last few decades, border security management has faced complex challenges, not only from increased cross-border transportation and trade but also from the emergence of such threats as the Covid-19 pandemic, refugees, illegal migrant workers, smuggling and terrorism. To respond to and these challenges and threats, a breakthrough is required in border security management.

The concept of border security is closely associated with the concept of national security and the use of force by state officials to ensure the security of sovereign territory. Military units are stationed in the border area to deal with threat and danger. Security is a complex concept with military, economic, political, and environmental aspects. In more general terms, security is understood as the safety of life support systems and the absence of threats to people's lives and their activities. From a limology or border studies perspective, it is important to identify who is

responsible for security and what are the threats to a country's borders (Kolossoff, 2006, Fauzan, et al., 2019).

Conceptually, border security fits into the broader category of what is often called “homeland security.” In its most basic sense, border security involves managing the flow of people and goods across national borders. This concept is applicable to different terrains (land, water, urban, rural) and threats (illegal migrants, smuggling of illegal goods, spread of disease). In theory, countries should design and implement border security initiatives in a comprehensive, strategic, and sequential manner. In other words, countries should start by identifying their strategic imperatives, such as preventing human trafficking or the illegal entry of people. They will then identify the necessary corollaries – such as systems to prevent smuggling – to meet these strategic requirements. Finally, states will deploy human or technological resources to implement their border security policies (Nelson et al., 2010).

Nelson (2010) believes that border security is part of homeland security. According to Nelson, border security:

“...includes safeguarding a state's land, air, and water domains; deterring threats along these borders; and securing all points of entry, which are locations such as seaports, airports, and land border crossings, where officials are stationed to oversee the legal entry and exit of persons and merchandise.”

Furthermore, according to Nelson (2010), border security has three functions: detection, interdiction and deterrence. Detection involves identifying border crossers (people and goods) and classifying potential threats. Interdiction is carried out by, for example, placing border security officers or such technologies as sensors, X-rays, CCTVs, scanners and drones to increase the effectiveness of border surveillance. Meanwhile, deterrence is carried out by installing obstacles along the border to prevent unwanted cross-border mobility, for example, building walls or placing barbed wire.

Aniszewski (2009) and Polner (2011) proposed the concept of Coordinated Border Management (CBM), which involves the coordination of border management between related agencies to ensure

effective and efficient border control processes and procedures. The CBM approach includes: *first*, the existence of an internal border management system which coordinates among relevant institutions within a country and *second*, an international border management system that coordinates between a country and its neighbors. Both approaches require cooperation among institutions at the regional, provincial and central levels, where communication is the basis for coordination and cooperation.

According to ICMPD (2015), the Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept involves national and international coordination and cooperation between all relevant authorities and institutions involved in border security and trade facilitation to build an effective, efficient and coordinated border management.

Turkey, a transcontinental country which separates Europe and Asia, has borders with such countries as Bulgaria to the northwest, Greece to the west, Georgia to the northeast, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran to the east, as well as Iraq and Syria in the southeast. Although its border area is vast, Turkey does not have a special institution to manage it. However, the Turkish government provides similar infrastructure/public services for all regions, both border and non-border. The Turkish government uses a BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) system in developing its border areas, where the majority of border development is handled by private parties so that the government does not have to spend too much money (Wuryandari, et al., 2009).

The Vietnamese government also permits the involvement of the private sector in border construction. Vietnam does not have a special agency in charge of border matters but its Ministry of Home Affairs oversees these matters. Vietnam divides its border areas into special economic development zones, with the private sector bearing the brunt of the cost of border development and the state providing the required balance (Wuryandari, et al., 2009).

Unlike Vietnam, border management is the responsibility of the Malaysian federal government. State governments, however, may submit proposals for the development of border areas. But the federal government still plays a very important role. As borders are considered an important part of state security, border matters are handled by the National Security Council (*Majlis Keselamatan Negara*, MKN), which reports directly to the Prime Minister. This border is part of the MKN's

one-door policy pillars, along with two other important pillars, namely disaster crises and state sovereignty/strategic interests (Zulkarnain & Roisah, 2018).

Further, according to Newman and Paasi (1998), borders serve to protect a country from internal and external threats and to determine a country's territory. Borders also define the internal and external identity of a country's territory. Contemporary literature on border management focuses on hard borders and soft borders. Hard borders are fortified borders, including wire fences, walled borders and a military presence along the borders (Chavez, 2012; Espejo, 2013), while soft borders include open, regulated and controlled borders (see picture).

Ullah and Kumpoh (2018) argue that border typology determines the level of relations among neighboring countries and the degree of security, trade and population mobility at the border. The border typology described by Ullah and Kumpoh (2018) is shown below:




Figure 1. Hard Border and Soft Border Typology.

Source: Adapted from Ullah and Kumpoh (2018)

Border governance is a concept often used in managing cross-border mobility. As defined by Zumbusch and Scherer (2015), it is a set of cross-border cooperative institutions involving various actors at the subnational level with the aim of overcoming challenges related to national borders. Meanwhile, Tandia (2010) highlights border governance as a collective regime where inter-local problems in border areas are managed and borders are regulated within a national framework. Thus, border governance consists of three elements: (1) actors from two countries sharing a

border; (2) collaboration in the form of cooperation or collective regime/policy; and (3) an aim of managing or overcoming joint problems.

In the context of land border security in Indonesia, the PLBN elements consist of customs, immigration, quarantine and security (CIQS) which support border security management. Border security is understood not only as traditional security (defence), but also as non-traditional security (transnational crimes). In Indonesia, border management in general and border security management at PLBN are coordinated by the National Agency for Border Management (BNPP).

Development of Cross-Border Post (PLBN) in West Kalimantan-Sarawak

To deal with security and economic problems at its border, Indonesia has built cross-border posts at various points along Indonesia's borders with neighbouring countries. The first phase of PLBN development is based on Presidential Instruction (*Instruksi Presiden*) No. 6/2015 concerning the Acceleration of Development of 7 (Seven) Integrated Cross-Border Posts and Supporting Infrastructure in Border Areas. The second phase of PLBN development is based on Presidential Instruction (*Instruksi Presiden*) No. 1/2019 concerning the Acceleration of Development of 11 (Eleven) Integrated National Border Posts and Supporting Infrastructure in Border Areas. Of the 7 PLBNs built in the first phase, three were built in the West Kalimantan border area, namely Aruk, Badau and Entikong (see figure 2).

The first phase of PLBN construction was completed and inaugurated by President Joko Widodo at the end of 2016 and early 2017. Meanwhile, the second phase of PLBN construction in West Kalimantan is underway, with the construction of PLBN Jagoi Babang (Bengkayang) and PLBN Sei Kelik (Sintang). These two PLBNs are still under construction and not yet officially operational.



Figure 2. Three PLBNs in West Kalimantan

Source: BNPP, 2022

The PLBNs are meant to facilitate relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. It is hoped that the development of PLBNs in several border areas will not only function as entry and exit points for people and goods into Indonesian territory, but also increase the mobility of goods, vehicles and services. The PLBNs also make it easier for border residents to carry out their daily cross-border activities. The development of PLBNs in West Kalimantan is important because the region shares a land border with Sarawak for 976 km (KSP, 2021).

The following is an overview of the three PLBNs located on the West Kalimantan-Sarawak border. First, PLBN Aruk. Administratively, PLBN Aruk is located at Sebunga village, Sajingan Besar subdistrict, Sambas district, West Kalimantan province, with coordinates between $2^{\circ}08^{\circ}$ N and $0^{\circ}33^{\circ}$ S, and between $108^{\circ}39^{\circ}$ and $110^{\circ}04^{\circ}$ E. PLBN Aruk was built on an area of 9.1 Ha (BNPP, 2021). The Aruk Border Post has been operational since January 1, 2011, although it was later modernized and renovated starting March 17, 2016. The distance from PLBN Aruk to Sambas (capital of Sambas Regency) is around 17 km; the distance to Pontianak (the capital of West Kalimantan Province) is around 296 km; the distance to Sematan is 27 km, and its distance to Kuching (Sarawak) is about 114 km.

Second, the Entikong PLBN is administratively located in Entikong village, Entikong sub-district, Sanggau district. PLBN Entikong is paired with the Tebedu cross-border post, in the Sarawak

region, Malaysia. The distance to Tebedu is around 3.7 km, the distance to Kuching city is around 107 km, and the distance to Sanggau city is around 127 km. The distance by road from Pontianak city to PLBN Entikong is around 243 km and takes approximately 5 hours through parts of Kubu Raya district and Sanggau district. PLBN Entikong, the first and oldest cross-border post in Indonesia, began operations on October 1, 1989, but was then modernized and put back into operations starting December 21, 2016 with its inauguration by President Joko Widodo.

Third, PLBN Badau is in a small town located in Kapuas Hulu district, West Kalimantan province and is between 0' 05' N and 1' 4' S, and between 111' 40' and 114' 10' E (BNPP, 2021). PLBN Badau can be reached via river (846 km), road (633 km), and by air (two-hour flight from Pontianak via Pangsuma). PLBN Badau is about 150 km from Putussibau, the capital of Kapuas Hulu district, West Kalimantan. PLBN Badau is located 3.7 km from Lubok Antu (Sarawak) and about 264 km from Kuching.

From 2017 to 2022, the number of border crossers who passed through the three PLBNs fluctuated, but decreased drastically from 2020 to 2021 because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Table 1. Number of people using PLBN Aruk, PLBN Entikong, and PLBN Badau, 2017 – 2022

Location	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Aruk	na	207,884	256,258	83,251	11,262	165,291
Entikong	499,200	387,155	346,208	90,757	na	202,762
Badau	25,939	98,952	107,742	19,729	44	22,991

Source: Data processed from BNPP, 2017-2022.

Among the three PLBNs, the greatest number of people passed through the Entikong PLBN. This happened because, apart from PLBN Entikong being the first border post opened in the Kalimantan-Sarawak border area, the distance between the city of Pontianak and PLBN Entikong is the shortest, compared to the other two PLBNs. Meanwhile, the lowest number of people passed through PLBN Badau because the distance between Pontianak and PLBN Badau is the farthest.

The development of modern and integrated cross-border posts (PLBN) is expected to have a trickledown effect on border residents by: (1) increasing the mobility of people, goods, vehicles, and services between Indonesia and Malaysia; (2) improving the economy in vicinity of the PLBN and rest areas along roads used by vehicles traveling interstate; (3) expanding economic opportunities for community businesses around PLBN (export – import); and increasing tourism between the two countries.

Challenges of PLBN Development

The PLBNs in several border areas aim at opening access to isolated areas, facilitating mobility and strengthening connectivity between Indonesia and Malaysia. The presence of PLBNs and government officials such as customs, immigration, quarantine and security (CIQS) is also a form of state presence at the border (Kemlu, 2021). With the construction of the PLBNs, it is hoped that security management problems at the border can be handled effectively and efficiently so that illegal activities that occur frequently can be prevented resolved quickly.

One dimension of border security management is the existence of cross-border posts (PLBN) which act as exit/entry points for people, vehicles and goods from one country to another. A function of cross-border posts is managing border security, which is why this PLBN institution has such elements as customs, immigration, quarantine and security. However, in the context of the Indonesian border, problems still remain with the institutional, coordination, legal and human resource aspects of border management.

The function of Customs is to supervise the entry and exit of goods into and out of Indonesian territory, as well as determining taxes. Law (*Undang-Undang*) No. 17/2006 concerning Customs and Excise states that the duties of Customs officials are financial management related to customs and excise, supervision of exports and imports, and implementation of laws directly related to exports and imports. From the Customs side, the duties and functions at the border include: (1) collecting import and export duties as well as excise on goods at the border; (2) protecting people, especially at the border, from the entry of dangerous goods from abroad; (3) providing easy cross-border trade facilities, including carrying out tasks entrusted by other agencies at the border; and (4)

protecting domestic industry from unfair competition with similar industries from abroad (Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2021).

Article 3 (3) of Law (*Undang-Undang*) No. 6/2011 states that immigration functions along Indonesia's territorial borders are carried out by Immigration officials at Immigration Checkpoints and border crossing posts. They have the authority to issue and check travel documents and visas, and stamp the border crossers' travel documents. At the border, Immigration carries out the following functions: (1) checking the travel documents of Indonesian citizens and foreign citizens entering or leaving Indonesian territory; (2) stamping travel documents as proof the traveller has permission to enter or leave Indonesian territory; and (c) guarding the border area to prevent crossings that are not in accordance with Indonesian law.

Quarantine's major responsibility is to prevent the entry and exit of infectious diseases in humans, animals and plants. The quarantine-implementing agencies consist of those in charge of animal and plant quarantine under the Ministry of Agriculture and human quarantine under the Ministry of Health. According to Law (*Undang-Undang*) No. 16/1992 concerning Animal and Plant Quarantine, quarantine is defined as isolating and/or acting to prevent the entry and spread of animal pests and diseases or plant pest organisms from abroad and from one area to another within the country, or their exit from within the territory of Indonesia. The function of quarantine at PLBNs is to monitor and prevent the entry of pests and animal diseases or plant-disturbing organisms by implementing quarantine for food crops, horticultural and plantation crops, animals and monitoring imported and exported animals, animal products, plants and plant products at cross-border posts.

Quarantine related to diseases that threaten humans is under the supervision of the Port Health Office (*Kantor Kesehatan Pelabuhan-KKP*) at the border. Health Quarantine is an effort to prevent and prevent the entry or exit of diseases and/or public health risk factors that have the potential of causing a public health emergency (UU No. 6/2028). In carrying out the health quarantine function at PLBN, the main task of the KKP is to prevent the entry and exit of quarantine diseases and other infectious diseases that have the potential to become epidemics. From a geographical perspective, KKPs are usually located in international seaport areas, international airport areas and national border crossing posts, which are strategic for domestic and international trade traffic.

These areas provide economic and trade benefits for Indonesia, as well as impact and influence the spread of infectious and other diseases that have the potential of becoming outbreaks from the traffic of people, ships/planes and goods.

In addition to the CIQ elements, the police is also involved in border security management at the PLBNs. The police is normatively the party that has the most authority in matters of internal security at the border. Law No. 2/2002, which concerns the police, does not specifically discuss police duties or law enforcement in border areas. But article 13 of Law No. 2/2002 confirms that the duties of the police include: (1) maintaining security and public order; (2) carrying out law enforcement; and (3) providing protection/care and services to the community. Derived from this legal regulation is the Chief of Police Decree (*Keputusan Kepala Kepolisian*) No. Kep/1234/VIII/2018 concerning Police Stations/Substations in the Outermost Small Islands Region and/or Border Areas, where the duties and responsibilities of the police are, namely, carrying out security in all border areas and the outermost small islands.

The Indonesian National Army (TNI) also plays a major role in securing border areas. Law (*Undang-Undang*) No. 34/2008 states that the TNI is given the authority to secure border areas (article 7, paragraph 1). The TNI's main tasks, as intended in paragraph 1, are military operations for war (*operasi militer perang*, OMP) and military operations other than war (*operasi militer selain perang*, OMSP). One of the TNI's tasks in military operations other than war (OSMP) (Article 7, paragraph 2, point four) is to secure border areas. Article 8 states that the TNI Army is tasked with maintaining the security of land areas with other countries. Operationally, to secure the land border area, the TNI has established its main policy as deploying troops along the land border. The assignment of TNI units in the border areas is typically only for a predetermined period of time, around six to nine months (Noverita et. al., 2016). The main task of the Border Security Task Force (*Satuan Tugas Pengamanan Perbatasan, Satgas Pamtas*) is to carry out border area security operations. This unit also prevents violations of state territorial boundaries by patrolling state border markers.

In addition to military operational tasks, the Border Security Task Force also carries out such non-military tasks as teaching in schools on the border area, providing materials about the national ideology, marching, as well as engaging in community service and sports with residents of border

communities (Zulkarnain & Roisah, 2018). In addition, Minister of Defense Regulation (*Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan*) No. 4/2017, which concerns the deployment of the Indonesian National Army in Border Security, states that the management of defense priority areas is conducted by: (1) creating border patrol inspection routes; (2) building border security posts on a priority scale; and (3) building roads connecting one border post with another border post. This legal basis supports the deployment of TNI troops and the Border Security Task Force at many points in the border area.

While the Regulations of the Head of BNPP (2017) state that the Police and TNI are not the organising units of cross-border services at PLBNs, they are still required to support the implementation of cross-border services. The police as a law enforcement element is not directly involved in PLBN management but provides protection and services to the communities outside the PLBN area. Likewise, while the TNI may be present at a PLBN, it does not play a direct role in the management of the PLBN.

However, the policies implemented by the relevant institutions have not been carried out optimally. Two things that require attention regarding security issues in border areas (Fauzan, 2016) are an understanding of the functions of the TNI and CIQS. As TNI Law does not clearly outline the TNI's duties regarding the securing of border areas, its implementation sometimes overlaps with other agencies. Because customs, immigration and quarantine clearly should play a role at a PLBN, there are fewer issues regarding their functions. It is still unclear which agency, the Police or the TNI, should have authority over matters of security at the PLBNs.

The existing laws related to border security are indirect in nature, that is, the laws do not directly regulate the main tasks of the relevant agencies, but make border security part of a more general task. The pertinent laws are Law (*Undang-Undang*) No. 3/2002 concerning National Defense, Law No. 2/2002 concerning the Police, as well as Law (*Undang-Undang*) No. 34/2004 concerning the TNI but more specific regulations regarding security management at the border are unavailable. This situation might lead to overlap as the TNI, Police, Customs, Immigration, and Quarantine carry out their respective responsibilities at the border.

Internationally, however, it is understood that the management of cross-border posts is the responsibility of Immigration, Customs and Quarantine. But, for various reasons, the security function is embedded in the PLBNs. In addition to the issue of the involvement of several agencies in border security, another issue that is just as important is the inadequate condition of existing infrastructure and managerial facilities to support integrated CIQS functions. The elements in CIQS have their respective duties. Customs functions as a supervisor of the traffic in and out of goods. Immigration determines who can enter and leave the country. Quarantine is divided into 3 (three) parts, namely animal, plant and human quarantine, which aims to prevent the entry of goods, animals, plants and people carrying epidemics and infectious diseases.

The lack of integration between agencies in border security management has also given rise to the TNI dominating the management of security in border areas. This domination is evident in the degree of authority that the TNI has in determining the flow of people and goods, as well as managing the opening and closing of doors/gates at the border between the two countries at several crossing points, including the small illegal routes or rat paths (*jalur tikus*).

However, it must be acknowledged that the role of the TNI in securing border areas is very important. In the midst of difficulties in securing the Indonesia-Malaysia land border area, the TNI has been able to overcome various threats of transnational crimes. The TNI has had to cope with a border which stretches for approximately 976 km with limited security systems and patterns with limited numbers of TNI and police personnel, as well as inadequate security infrastructure and facilities.

In managing security on the West Kalimantan-Sarawak border, there has been good cooperation between Indonesian and Malaysian security forces, as evidenced by the border security task force collaboration between the TNI and the Royal Malaysian Army through the formation of Joint Posts. "Through this Joint Post, 10 personnel from the Border Security Task Force are assigned to the border post belonging to the Royal Malaysian Army, and conversely, 10 personnel from the Royal Malaysian Army who guarded the border area are also assigned to the Indonesian Border Security Task Force Post." One of these Joint Posts is at the Border Security Task Force Post in the West Kalimantan border area in Sebunga village, Sambas (Zulkarnain & Roisah, 2018).

The challenges facing the PLBNs are: first, the increasing number of cross-border activities (people, goods and vehicles) entering and leaving Indonesian territory; second, the increasing risks that develop as a result of the increase in border crossers, where these risks become increasingly dynamic in terms of forms and impacts; and third, the increasing public demands for the CIQ to provide effective and efficient services for border crossers.

***Jalur Tikus* and Border Security Issues**

While the border area in Kalimantan is generally a transition area between two legally different regions (Indonesia-Malaysia), it is inhabited by people who are socio-culturally similar. They have long interacted and established kinship across the political line that separate them. Many of these interactions are carried out not only through legal but also illegal routes often referred to as *jalur tikus* or rat paths (see Ishikawa, 2010, 2018). A rat path refers to a small route, or a small road, or a traditional road that is not usually used by public transportation. It can also refer to an unofficial or illegal route. Rat paths are usually well known by local people (Brata, 2021). The rat path is a route used by border crossers to cross the territory of another country via unofficial routes. Most of these rat routes are unguarded, so they have become a choice for border crossers, both local people carrying out socio-economic activities and transnational criminals.

Smuggling at the border by road rats, which are also known as *smokeel* (Pamungkas, 2018; Ishikawa, 2018), is the result when state border management has not accommodated the economic needs of local communities. From time to time, the number of rat lines has increased, along with the construction of PLBNs and the recent Covid-19 pandemic. On one hand, the construction of PLBNs increases mobility within the country's territory, but on the other, the existence of the PLBN is avoided by transnational criminals.

As local cross-border transport hubs are transformed into official entry and exit points, the rat paths, established and used for informal border crossing, are being replaced by wider roads to facilitate the increased traffic. Some of the routes along which raw rubber sheets were illegally transported to Sarawak during the rubber boom have been converted into major corridors connecting the state capitals, Pontianak and Sarawak. Traditional *jalur tikus* have become *jalan gajah*

or elephant roads, connecting border towns not only to Pontianak dan Sarawak, but also to other major towns in Kalimantan and Borneo regions (Ishikawa, 2018, Fauzan, 2022).

The Head of BNPP, Tito Karnavian, stated that the rat paths threaten Indonesia's land border areas. BNPP noted that, in West Kalimantan, there are at least 60 rat paths for such illegal activities as crossing people, basic necessities, to dangerous things (see picture).

"The border lines are not very clear, traditional crossings occur, this can happen if it is not controlled, there will be crossings of illegal people and illegal goods. Through unmonitored borders, there are potentials for smuggling of narcotics, dangerous chemical goods, bomb detonators, fish bombs, human trafficking, arms smuggling and acts of terrorism will threaten the national security." (Republika, 2019).



Figure 3. Rat Paths (*Jalur Tikus*) on the West Kalimantan – Sarawak border

Source: OPS Task Force. PAMTAS Battalion Raider 641/BRU, 2019

The official border gates in West Kalimantan are at Aruk, Entikong and Badau. There are also two PLBNs built by the Indonesian government, namely PLBN Jagoi Babang (Bengkayang) and Sei Kelik (Sintang). However, outside of these official routes, there are many unofficial routes that are used as crossings for cross-border activities.

Along the border, unofficial border gates have long been used as traditional contact routes within the framework of kinship. It is alleged that these unofficial routes, which were originally traditional routes, are presently often used as routes for trans-national crimes, such as transporting migrant workers to enter and work in neighbouring countries or such other actions as smuggling prohibited goods.

Considering the geography and topography, as well as the limited number of PLBNs along the 976 kilometers long border between Sarawak and West Kalimantan, the transportation of goods in and out of the unofficial border routes (*jalur tikus*) is an urgent need that must be addressed. Another significant issue is the flow of undocumented people through unofficial border routes. Therefore, the Executive Office of the President (KSP) is encouraging the strengthening of the Border Security Task Force, especially along the 976 km land border between West Kalimantan, Indonesia and Sarawak, Malaysia. KSP Main Expert Ade Irfan Pulungan regrets the widespread exploitation of natural resources, illegal movement of people and even narcotics transactions that occur on border crossing routes, which causes huge losses to the state (KSP, 2021).

The motive for smuggling goods (illegal trade) in the West Kalimantan region is that border communities need basic and other necessities for their daily needs, which are easier and cheaper to obtain from Sarawak, rather than waiting for them to be available in domestic shops. However, other parties (*Tauke*) often take advantage of the smuggling activities carried out by local communities to meet the needs of border communities. The *taukses* buy goods smuggled from Sarawak to resell to other areas, such as in Pontianak, and, in the case of such products as used clothing, liquor and narcotics, even to Java. The need for used clothing, liquor and narcotics are met by smuggling through the West Kalimantan border area (Suprpto, 2021).

The people of Kalimantan benefit from the Sosek Malindo trade agreement (Socio-Economic Cooperation Agreement between Malaysia-Indonesia). For example, commodities from Malaysia that often enter Indonesian territory through the Entikong PLBN are such daily necessities as granulated sugar, cooking oil, eggs, milk, frozen meat (chicken, fish and beef), chocolate, cans and other necessities, like LPG (Liquefied petroleum gas). Meanwhile, commodities from Indonesia that are brought into Malaysia are agricultural products such as pepper, cocoa, vanilla and durian, as well as such instant foods as noodles (Suprpto, 2021).

One example is the rat path in the Jagoi Babang area. This rat path is actually not that far from where PLBN Jagoi Babang is. This rat path is in a rubber plantation in the Bengkayang and Serikin areas. There are indications that this rat path is used to transport plantation products from Indonesian territory to Malaysian territory without going through the proper procedures. This route can also be used to import such prohibited goods as drugs from Malaysia to Indonesia or vice versa. Besides being used as a delivery route for plantation commodity goods, this route can be readily used as access for prohibited goods across countries. For example, in January 2020, an attempt to smuggle more than 500 cartons of cigarettes in several trucks via this route was thwarted. It is suspected that unofficial crossing points in the Jagoi Babang area are used for the interests of large-scale economic groups or circles, not for the purposes of meeting the daily needs of the local community (BNPP, 2021). (See figure below).



Figure 4. Jalur tikus in Jagoi Babang

Source: BNPP, 2021.

Jalur tikus in West Kalimantan have become a haven for dealers to smuggle drugs into Indonesia. Recently, on two separate occasions, TNI soldiers have found dozens of kilograms of methamphetamine, while carrying out patrols in the Indonesia-Malaysia border area (Kompas, 2021).

Meanwhile, Head of the Eradication Division of the West Kalimantan Provincial National Narcotics Agency (BNNP), Kombes Pol Ade Yana Supriyana, stated that currently most drug smuggling at the border is conducted via rat routes in the forest.

“Sabu or other drugs enter not through the border (official entry route), but through the forest, because not all routes are guarded by the authorities. The dealers also often use local residents who are already familiar with the conditions of the border forests to act as couriers. They brought drugs via empty rat routes (*jalur tikus*), unguarded by authorities. Most of the couriers are also people there (local residents) who are familiar with the conditions there” (Kompas, 2021).

It has been determined that this type of methamphetamine drug was produced in China, transited East Malaysia and then entered Indonesia via the border in West Kalimantan. The lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic have not really affected drug trafficking, especially in West Kalimantan. The Head of the West Kalimantan Province BNN Eradication Division suspects that a major drug dealer in Malaysia sent the package using a courier service to Indonesia.

Head of the Border Security Task Force for Battalion 645 TNI AD, Lt. Col. Hudallah, said:

“The number of *jalur tikus* in border areas in the West Kalimantan region continues to increase. Currently there are 90 *jalur tikus* detected, but in the 3 weeks we entered (patrolling), there were an additional 7 *jalur tikus*. The terrain is very varied, some can be passed by trucks, some are mud paths. The rat roads are used by people who want to enter and leave Malaysia illegally, and vice versa.” (Kumparan, 2022).

Weak supervision at border gates can lead to widespread illegal cross-border activities and cross-border crimes which can harm Indonesia's security and economy. Border areas have long been the area for such illegal activities as goods smuggling, human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, etc. It is hoped that the opening of the PLBNs in several West Kalimantan border areas will have a positive impact on the economy,

The increase in border security issues in Indonesia is consistent with the rapid development of cross-border activities for people and goods, both by land, sea and air. To anticipate border security issues in its sovereign territory, the Indonesian government has made several efforts to accelerate the development of an integrated border security system, as well as optimize cooperation between countries to uphold sovereignty, security and law. These efforts include:

First, improving an integrated border security system. The vast land border area between West Kalimantan and Sarawak requires serious attention from the government. The border areas are rife with transnational criminal activities. Apart from building PLBNs, the government should build numerous monitoring posts along the border. The limited number of border security posts and facilities along the border area is an obstacle to effective security of the border area. The number of guard posts and facilities available is not commensurate with the length of the Kalimantan-Sarawak land border line. Likewise, the number of police posts along the border is still minimal in number and facilities.

Second, improving service and inspection facilities at PLBNs and securing unofficial routes. The existence of PLBNs along with customs, immigration, quarantine and security (CIQS) facilities as doors/gates that regulate the flow of people and goods in and out of border areas is very important. As the country's gateway, the existence of PLBN is expected to regulate social and economic relations between Indonesian people and people in neighbouring countries. To support the smooth functioning of the PLBN, supporting infrastructures must be available, such as buildings with modern CIQ support, information and communication technology equipment, electricity supply, economic facilities (markets and dry-ports), roads, and so on.

Third, increasing security cooperation with neighbouring countries. The problem of border security threats cannot be resolved by a country alone. It needs to involve neighbouring countries because cross-border criminal activities take place in border areas and they involve actors and targets who are cross-border. To deal with this problem requires cooperation involving both military and non-military security forces between bordering countries. Collaborative activities should include joint border security patrols involving military and police elements from both countries, exchanging intelligence information, and so on.

Conclusion

Border security issues have been a common problem in the Indonesia-Malaysia land border area for many years. Starting with traditional threats in the form of armed movements, the issue of border security today has been replaced by non-traditional threats, which seem to be increasingly unclear in terms of determining the actual opponents and threats. This is because border threats do not clearly originate from a specific country, institution, or organization. Border security issues are now increasingly dynamic and global due to economic demands (smuggling, illegal immigrants and human trafficking), as well as geo-strategic threats (terrorism and super-power influence). As an effort to address land border security issues, Indonesia has built several PLBNs to carry out administrative and supervisory service functions for border crossers, prevent the threat of transnational crime, and become an embryo for economic development and growth in border areas. The government has equipped various facilities at PLBNs and placed control functions involving customs, immigration, quarantine and security. Outside the PLBN area and along the West Kalimantan-Sarawak land border, a number of border security task force posts with TNI personnel have also been placed to guard the border area from various transnational crimes committed through unofficial routes (*jalur tikus*). On one hand, the development of the PLBN has been able to prevent and reduce cross-border crimes through these posts, but on the other, cross-border crimes have increased and are committed through routes that are still minimally guarded and supervised.

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Regulations

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