

An Empirical Investigation on the Role of *Barakah* in the Islamic Theory of Consumer Choice

Munrokhim Misanam

ABSTRACT

Conventional consumer theory biased toward western values. Eventhough there is a soaring claim of being free from any value, but, the fact shows that the formulation of action resulted from western economic analysis biases strongly toward the core of western value, that is, individualistic value. However, the value loaded in western theory of consumer choice does not match the Islamic teaching. In this paper, a theoretical model implied by Islammic values which represents the behaviour of Moslem consumer in choosing goods among alternatives. From empirical evidence, the results show that awareness, consistency and neutrality come together and simultaneously, it is safe to say that awareness implies consistency. While consistency further implies neutrality. This means that the revelation-deduction-based prediction over the relationship between awareness, consistency and neutrality meets reality. This shows that Moslem consumers does aware of the existence and the extent of barakah in the product they are considering to buy. They also behave rationally in that they make a consistent buying decision based on their investigation. Finally, when seeing two goods with different barakah content they will find it easy to neglect the one with no barakah in it eventhough the price is lower. This further implies that the practice of Islamic theory of consumption does exist, and therefore, abort the accusation that Islamic economics is merely normative.

Keywords: consumer theory; barakah; consumer choice; Islamic economics; falah

BACKGROUND

Conventional consumer theory biased toward Western values. Eventhough there is a soaring claim of being free from any value, but, the fact shows

that the formulation of action resulted from Western economic analysis biases strongly toward the core of Western value, that is, individualistic value.

The individualistic value has been central in Western society. In this context, we do not intend to show that this value is good or bad. Rather, first we need to show that economic doctrine found in Western world is not value free but value loaded. For example when one examines the consumer behaviour doctrine of Western microeconomics, one will see that, first, the concern of the consumer should merely be on his/her own utility. In this aspect, the consumer is assumed to be utility maximising. Assuming the initial situation where an individual has been in his/her maximum point of utility, in this situation there is no further question as to how the others be able to meet the minimum requirement for their life. This thing is assumed to be beyond the business of everybody. Secondly, one will see from the formulation of action that to achieve the maximum utility the thing to consider is only everybody's own budget. The formulation of action recommends that those with big money should buy big number of goods, regardless of the availability of the good in the market. All the aforementioned arrangements reflect the embodiment of individualistic value in the theory of consumer choice.

The value loaded in Western theory of consumer choice does not match the Islamic teaching. Islam concerns on the welfare of everybody entirely in the society. Islamic doctrine teaches that there should no be any individual left in miserly while the others are in prosperity. Accordingly, those with big money are not supposed to fully exercise his/her purchasing power if the availability of the goods in the market is in shortfall. In this case, everybody should get the good at least at the minimum level of the need. In short, harmony is the ultimate goal of Islamic concept of human life. This is, of course, contradicts to individualistic value embodies in Western economic theory. Therefore, Islamic world should find an economic concept originally from, and hence in accord to, their own doctrines.

This article presents a theoretical model implied by Islamic values which represents the behaviour of moslem consumer in choosing good among alternatives. Further, this article explores the real behaviour of moslem consumer utilising the theoretical model that has been established before. This is nothing but to get confirmation of the model from the empirical evidence.


THE STATE OF *MASLAHAH* AND *BARAKAH* IN ISLAMIC CONSUMER CHOICE

To find the Islamic economic doctrine of consumption, one should trace it through fundamental value of Islam where every moslem is supposed to refer when planning to do something. The very fundamental teaching of Islam is that the ultimate goal for every Moslem to reach is *falah*. *Falah* is a goodness both in the perspective of this worldly life and in hereafter. From this definition one could see that Moslem do not only consider worldly life but also the life in hereafter. The hereafter life is viewed a consequence of the worldly life. Moreover, hereafter life is a reward and also a punishment to any individual who did something good or bad in the world. One will not do any conduct that is perceived good from worldly-life perspective but is considered bad from hereafter point of view. One can simply say that worldly and hereafter life joints together. A person does well in his/her worldly life (*hayatan thayyiban*), he/she will get a good life in hereafter too. A good life (*hayatan thayyiban*) is, of course, the one that always uses Islamic teaching as a reference.

Beside *falah*, there is also *Ibadah*. *Ibadah* is also the goal of moslem individual (Qur'an, 51:56) The different between *falah* and *ibadah* is that *falah* is the ideal goal while *ibadah* is the operational one. This statement gives a meaning that *ibadah* is an operationalisation of *falah* because *falah* is a quiet intangible concept. With this nature of *falah* Moslem individual may have a difficult time to identify the way to reach *falah*. In this situation, God (Allah Azza wa jalla) provide an assistance by granting a "manual" for moslem individual to reach *falah*, that is, *ibadah*. Whoever doing *ibadah* he/she will be able to reach *falah*. Any good deed addressed to please God is considered *ibadah*. In a broader sense, one may say that any conduct that get legitimation from Islamic values is considered an *ibadah*. This, of course, is in line with the concept of Islamic rationality (Misanam 2005). In this concept a moslem individual is considered rational only if he/she maximise good deed and minimise bad deed simultaneously, within the Islamic values.

Now, we need to turn to the other way to discuss *masalahah* and also it's relationship to *ibadah*. *Maslahah* is a wide-range concept of benefit which is far different from benefit (utility). Usually benefit is defined as a satisfaction or (usefulness) a consumer gets from consuming a good. Accordingly, any good or conduct is considered having benefit if it can generate satisfaction to those who consume it. This implies that doing drug is considered beneficial because this creates utility to the person

doing it in the form of releasing the person from having a severe illness resulted from being addicted to the drug. Furthermore, the magnitude of benefit is, of course, different among individuals. It depends on the state of each individual at the point of time of consumption. The same good consumed at the same time by different individual may generate different satisfaction because the states at which the consumers are experiencing is different. This is to show that benefit is strongly biased toward individual's situation. It is convenience to say, then, that a good may give benefit to an individual, but in contrary, create problem to the other. Smoking is one of many examples about this issue. If an individual is supposed to concern on benefit, this will creates a big possibility of arising problem following the conflict among individuals in the society. This is, of course, not a good concept for achieving harmonious life in society. Islam, on the other hand, wants to create harmonious life. Accordingly the concept of benefit/usefulness is rejected in Islam. The right concept is *maslahah* which does not only provide worldly usefulness but also grants a benefit from hereafter perspective. Accordingly if one consider *maslahah* in his life, and not utility, he should judge the benefit from both dimension: worldly life and hereafter. Eventhough a conduct gives a big usefulness from the worldly life point of view, it will not be considered a *maslahah* if it does not creates a good hereafter implication. This implies that in *maslahah* concept, goodness for an individual is also goodness for the other. Therefore, one can say that only good deed that can generate *maslahah*, or saying the other way, *maslahah* can only be generated from *ibadah*. There will be, accordingly, no conflict among individuals in the society resulted from the implementation of *maslahah* concept. To go further, we need to make the *maslahah* concept to be detail and operational. To do this, we need to make a comparison between benefit/usefulness concept and *maslahah*. To compare, individual satisfaction may be higher in benefit/usefulness concept than in *maslahah* concept. However, in the entire society *maslahah* concept provides higher magnitude. This is because the goodness one is experiencing will spread and expand all over the other individuals in the society. The expanding nature in this concept is, then, called *barakah* which is distinguishing characteristic of *maslahah*. According to this understanding one may be able to show that *maslahah* contains benefit/usefulness, but this must be the one that accompanied by *barakah*. The diagram below provide an assisstance to see all the issues discussed above.



EXPLORATION OF MASLAHAH AND BARAKAH

From the discussion above, barakah has been the central clue to operationalize maslahah. Any conduct should create barakah. Without barakah, any conduct will end up in a physical or psychological benefit/usefulness which may be contradicts the Islamic values. With barakah, a benefit/usefulness change to be maslahah. While maslahah as we know before is only implied by ibadah and therefore is strengthening the effort to reach *falah*. The next question is how moslem individual identify barakah? There are ample of approaches to do this, but in this article we use the most simple one, that is rewardability. If a good or a conduct to contain barakah, it has to avail reward. If a conduct is rewarded, meaning that this must be a good deed which implies barakah, and hence, creating maslahah. In contrary, if someone commits sin he/she will get punishment from God, and thus, the barakah is negative implying a negative maslahah which is mafsadah. The relationship may be modelled as te following:

$$M = U * B. \tag{1}$$

Where M, U and B are, respectively, maslahah, usefulness (benefit) and barakah. The interpretation of the expression is that the amount of maslahah will increase when the usefulness increases, given the amount of barakah. One may also say in the other way: the amount of maslahah increases following an increase in the amount of barakah, given the value of usefulness. To go into the heart of the issue, we need to stretch the above expression a bit. This is because the above expression represents a standard Moslem individual. In reality, not every moslem individual has a

property as it is shown above. To show the reality, the expression in equation (1) need to be modified as the following:

$$M = U * B^{\delta} \quad (2)$$

Where δ is the coefficient of awareness to barakah which has the magnitude of: $\delta \geq 0$. From this expression we will be able to derive the criteria of awareness to the barakah. If the magnitude of δ is equal to zero, the amount of masalahah (M) will fall to be same as U (usefulness). This means that the individual cannot feel the presence of barakah which is categorised as completely unaware (negligence). If the magnitude of δ is: $0 < \delta < 1$, the individual can only feel the presence of barakah partly. This group falls into category of partly aware. When the magnitude of δ is equal to unity, the individual can feel the amount of masalahah (M) is equal to the one expressed in equation (1), and the individual is called fully aware. Moreover, when the magnitude of δ is greater than unity, the individual can feel the presence of barakah greater than it is supposed to be, which is expressed in equation (1), and the individual is called extra ordinarily aware.

PROBLEM

The above presentation gives emphasis on the role of *barakah* in the *masalahah* concept. Moslem take *barakah* into their account before deciding to buy. If they observe there is *barakah* contained in a product they will buy, otherwise they keep away from purchasing the good. This will happen to the case when the consumer is aware of *barakah*. For those who are negligence, however, this will not be the case. For this type of consumer, there will be no different between goods with *barakah* and the one without it. The speculation is around whether awareness implies consistency. If suppose awareness implies consistency, the further question is does relative price (the difference between price of halalan-thayyiban good and that of non halalan-thayyiban one) affect purchase? If the answer is yes, meaning that awareness implies consistency and neutrality. By knowing the answer over this question, there will be a new knowledge about the behavior of Moslem consumers that will help to establish the Islamic Microeconomics. In more specific, the result of the study can see the extent to which *barakah* affect consumption of a product. Moreover, the study also provides a guidance for producers about what should they do if Moslem consumers were the target of selling.

THEORETICAL MODEL

A general rule about *barakah* may be found from Qur'an *Surah Al A'raf* 96,

"Yet if the people of those community had but attained to faith and been conscious of Us we would indeed have opened up for them blessing out of heaven and earth" (Mohammad Asad translation)

Regarding the rule of *barakah* as stated above, a standard moslem individual examines the *barakah* content in the good before purchasing it. He/she sets a criteria for a good that could be nominated for consumption, i.e. the good should have a minimum *barakah* content which can be acquired from *halalan thayyiban* good. The term *halalan thayyiban* is not only a criteria for *barakah* but also plays as a filter/constraint. Whenever the good or conduct does not meet the criteria, the individual will delete the good from the list of consumption.

LEMMAS

To formulate a strong academic concept over which one could derive model and further analysis in this matter one need several propositions about *barakah*.

LEMMA #1

Barakah is invisible but Moslem consumers can recognise the *barakah* content in a product through the product information provided by the producer or that are provided by other sources.

LEMMA #2

Although *barakah* cannot be fully quantified, Moslem consumers can differentiate the product with low *barakah* content from the one with high content according to the information they have.

The implication of the lemma is that the Moslem consumer will be able to rank the products according to the content of *barakah*.

LEMMA #3

Moslem consumer always set product qualification based on the minimum amount of *barakah* content.

This implies that the product will not enter the consumer list unless it has minimum amount of *barakah* content.

LEMMA #4

The *barakah* in the minimum level (B) cannot be substituted with the other product attribute (A). This is to say that,

$$P(A \cap B) = P(A) * P(B)$$

LEMMA #5

Cumulative joint probability density function of *barakah* (B), over the minimum level, and other attribute (A) is:

$$\int f(B)dB * f(A)dA$$

LEMMA #6

Non-satiation behaviour toward *barakah*. This implies that law of diminishing marginal *barakah* does not apply. This is to say that Moslems do not get bored even when they have got substantial amount of *barakah*.

DERIVATION OF MODEL

Based on the aforementioned lemmas, one could formulate model that describes Moslem consumers' behaviour toward acquisition of *barakah*. The procedure to derive the model will be employing masalah function, budget function and *barakah* function. Recall that minimum *barakah* criteria has a specific role as the constraint for everything that does not match the Islamic values. For example, the consumption is not supposed to trigger *israf*. In this situation, *israf* has been one of constraints for moslem individual in consumption. In the view of modelling, one does not have to put every constraint implied by Islamic values rather it is enough just to express these constraints as the minimum *barakah* criteria. This is so because, whatever conduct that does not match the Islamic values will not creates *barakah*; Or, this will not be *halalan thayyiban* which offers a minimum *barakah*. Considering the above argument, the procedure to derive the model should be designed to maximise masalah function subject to

budget and barakah function altogether using Lagrangian procedure. The following is entire procedure:

Let Maslahah function be: $M=f(X, Y, B_X, B_Y)$.

With B_X, B_Y are, consecutively, the barakah embedded on good X and good Y .

BUDGET CONSTRAINT

The algebraic expression of this constraint is:

$$I = P_X X + P_Y Y.$$

Where I is income and P_X and P_Y are, consecutively, price of X and of Y .

BARAKAH CONSTRAINTS

The barakah constraint reflects the extent to which Moslem consumers are concerned on the Islamic teaching. This constraint is:

$$B_1 = \frac{B_X}{X}; B_2 = \frac{B_Y}{Y}.$$

Where B_X/X and B_Y/Y are the average amount of barakah content in good X and good Y . While B_1 and B_2 indicate the qualification the consumer set for every good they need to consume *i.e.*, the minimum *barakah* content that has to be there in each good for the consumers are allowed to consume it.

For convenience, the expression of the constraint as written above is reexpressed in it's inverse (which will not alter the result):

$$\frac{1}{B_1} = \frac{B_X}{X}; \frac{1}{B_2} = \frac{B_Y}{Y}.$$

Put the Maslahah function and the constraints altogether, one could find the process by which Moslems maximise their maslahah. The Cob-Douglas type is employed to express the maslahah function. The choice to employ this type of function is of specific purpose; that is, the function can best describe the behavior. The utilisation of other type of function is possible and the result will be similar (anyone interested in this issue could try it). The following expression shows the detail.

LAGRANGIAN FUNCTION

$$\mathfrak{S} = X^\alpha Y^\beta + B_Y Y + B_X X + \lambda (I - P_X X - P_Y Y) + \tau_1 \left(\frac{1}{B_1} - \frac{X}{B_X} \right) + \tau_2 \left(\frac{1}{B_2} - \frac{Y}{B_Y} \right)$$

Differentiation of Lagrangian function with respect to X , Y , λ , B_X and B_Y respectively, and arrange terms and solve it gets the following results:

$$Y = \frac{I \left(2B_Y^2 B_1 + \beta B_X^\alpha B_Y^\beta B_1^\beta B_2^\alpha \right)}{P_Y \left(2B_Y^2 B_1 + B_X^2 B_2 + B_X^\alpha B_Y^\beta B_1^\beta B_2^\alpha \right)}, \text{ and}$$

$$X = \frac{I \left(2B_X^2 B_2 + \alpha B_Y^\beta B_X^\alpha B_2^\beta B_1^\alpha \right)}{P_X \left(2B_X^2 B_2 + B_Y^2 B_1 + B_X^\alpha B_Y^\beta B_1^\beta B_2^\alpha \right)}$$

Based on the above results, the demand function of the goods may be written as:

$$X = f(P_X, I, B_X, B_Y, B_1, B_2).$$

$$Y = f(P_Y, I, B_X, B_Y, B_1, B_2).$$

In the above functions, Prices of X and of Y and income (I) come out as determinants of demand for each good. This is in accord with the conventional demand theory. Moreover, the minimum requirement of *barakah* which are B_1 and B_2 , for good X and good Y respectively, and the *barakah* content, B_X and B_Y , of the products also emerge in the function. This indicates that Moslem consumers care about the *barakah* in their decision whether or not to consume the products.

Moreover, the following results shows the relationship between the quantity demanded and the price of other product.

$$\frac{dY}{dP_X} = 0.$$

The interpretation of the above result is that the demand for the product (Y) is independent on the change in the price of other product (P_X). This gives a strong theoretical support that the demand for the product is neutral to the relative price.

While the effect of the barakah content on demand can be derived also from the demand function:

$$\frac{dY}{dB_Y} > 0.$$

The formal interpretation of the above derivative is that when consumer see that the *barakah* content of the good increases, holding the other things constant, the consumer will consume the good more. This gives a theoretical foundation that barakah has a positive role in determining the demand for a product.

EMPIRICAL MODEL

The empirical model is established based on the theoretical model derived in the preceding section. The main point one could get from the section discussing theoretical model above is the embodiment of *maslahah* in the goods consumed. The *maslahah* however, can be decomposed into the following way:

$$M = M_W + M_H. \tag{3}$$

Where M_W and M_H are, respectively, *Maslahah* for the worldly life and for the hereafter.

Maslahah for the worldly life can only be enjoyed in this worldly life (M_W), while *maslahah* for the hereafter can be harvested in the hereafter, eventhough anyone could also feel a part of it in his/her current life. The last kind of *maslahah* is represented by *barakah* (B). So, the expression can be rewritten as the following:

$$M = M_W + B. \tag{4}$$

One may enjoy the current world *maslahah* (M_W) from the benefit or usefulness (U) or satisfaction he/she gets after consuming the good. The amount of *maslahah* of this type is fixed on a given time of consumption, but, it is decreasing overtime. Since it is fixed, the expression in equation (5) may be rewritten as:

$$M = U + B. \tag{5}$$

One may see that equation (6) is a logarithmic form of equation (1), which mean that both equation are exactly the same and ence carry the same value and meaning.

To accompany the issue of awareness, we should reconsider that the last expression represents the amount of *masalah* people perceive, with full awareness to *barakah*. While for those who do not aware to *barakah*, the amount of *masalah* they perceive is only:

$$M = U. \quad (6)$$

Considering this issue into the model, we may rewrite the expression of *masalah* to be:

$$M = U + dB. \quad (7)$$

Again, equation (F.6) is also a logarithmic transformation of equation (2) with δ represents the same thing. Therefore, the categories of awareness can be examined from the magnitude of d .

Adapting the above expression into empirical model, we should insert a disturbance term, so:

$$M = U + dB + h. \quad (8)$$

In the model of fully aware, the size of d is unity and hence the expression in (8) may be rewritten as:

$$M = U + B + h. \quad (9)$$

Now, we need to present the procedure by which a typical consumer follows to consume a good. The typical procedure for consumer to purchase a good is first observing the condition and characteristic of the goods he/she plans to buy. One crucial thing for Moslem consumer to see is *barakah* embedded in the good; Whether *barakah* content of the goods meets the requirement. In this step, one will see a crucial issue concerning which goods, among the others, to buy. A consumer is, then, viewed to be consistent if he/she brings the knowledge about the goods into the buying consideration. To see the procedure, let's express buying procedure as:

$$B_U = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P + \beta_2 I + \beta_3 M + \varepsilon. \quad (10)$$

where P and I , respectively, symbolize relative price and income. The expression in equation (10) is simply a modified standard demand function with M , *masalah*, is inserted to accommodate the Islamic behaviour.

Under the null hypothesis, it is argued that whenever the consumer is fully aware about the presence of *barakah* in the good, the magnitude of d is unity, he/she will bring his/her knowledge into buying consideration. This behaviour is also considered being consistence. The consistency implied by awareness can be expressed in the form of the substitution of equation (9) into equation (10). So,

$$B_U = (\beta_0 + \beta_3U) + \beta_1P + \beta_2I + \beta_3B + (\varepsilon + \beta_3\eta). \quad (11)$$

The next issue to see is how awareness and consistency are related to buying behavior. Referring to the theoretical model discussed in the preceding section, where the assumption of full awareness is imposed, it was shown that the buying behavior is neutral from relative price change. Accordingly, this kind of conduct may be represented as:

$$B_U = (\beta_0 + \beta_3U) + \beta_2I + \beta_3B + (\varepsilon + \beta_3\eta). \quad (12)$$

To summarise the discussion, we should make highlight over the issues in the model. First, the awareness is represented by the value of d which is unity in the model. Second, consistency issue introduces cross-equation restriction in equation (9) and (12) where the size of d is the same in both equations which is unity. Third, consistency implies that the magnitude of price coefficient in equation (11) is zero.

Upon defining these conditions, we may arrange the restricted model under the null hypothesis, that is, the model of aware, consistent and neutral. This may be represented by equation (9) and (12). Further, we need to compose the unrestricted model under the alternative hypothesis. To do this we should find a variant of equation (F.8.) The consistency and neutrality hypothesis creates cross-equation restriction. Accordingly, if we do not impose the restriction we will find that cross-equation restriction represented above will not apply. This is shown by the following equation:

$$B_U = (\beta_0 + \alpha_1U) + \beta_1P + \beta_2I + \beta_3\delta B + (\varepsilon + \beta_3\eta). \quad (13)$$

Therefore, the unrestricted model under alternative hypothesis is the model of unaware, inconsistency and irrational. This is a combination of equation (8) and (13). Comparing both system of equations one may see that there are three variables in the unrestricted system that do not present in the restricted system that are: α_1 , β_1 and δ . Therefore one can say that the number of restriction is three.

RESEARCH METHOD

OBJECT

The object of the research would be Moslem residing in Special Region of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The reason why choosing this region is of both

academical and practical purposes. Academic purpose dictates that the research should cover both Moslem with high and with low commitment. This is important to see the difference of concern in Islamic teaching and its effect on the behavior. On this perspective, the region best represents the criterion. This is because the region has two “groups” of Moslems: first who have “*Muhammadiyah*” background who are considered having higher commitment; While the other are those who have Javanese culture orientation, who are considered having lower commitment.

TECHNIQUE OF DATA ACQUISITION

This research will employ semi-experimental-behavioural-base. The plan would be explained in the following passages. First, researcher assistance will offer participant several quasi products with different prices. The quasi products will be designed in such a way that participant could differentiate the *barakah* content in each category of product. The expression of *barakah* content will vary according to its degree. From the very simple like halal-labelled product and non halal-labelled product. *Barakah* content could also be expressed in the form of information that the product is produced in Islamic way, or, the information about some part of the profit that will go to supporting *masajid*, Islamic activity, poor people and orphan kids. Second the participants will be endowed with a given amount of pseudo money by which they could buy the products. The research is restricted only on foods and beverages product.

ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE

Since the nature of the model is multi equations, the estimation technique is using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE). The restriction that is imposed in the equation has a non-linear structure. Accordingly, the estimation technique is also non-linear type of SURE. The expression of the model is:

$$y = X\beta + \epsilon$$

where:

$$y = \begin{bmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{bmatrix}; X = \begin{bmatrix} X_1 & 0 \\ 0 & X_2 \end{bmatrix}; \beta = \begin{bmatrix} \beta_1 \\ \beta_2 \end{bmatrix}; \epsilon = \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_1 \\ \epsilon_2 \end{bmatrix}.$$

The variance-covariance matrix is:

$$\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{11} & \sigma_{12} \\ \sigma_{21} & \sigma_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

define:

$$\Omega = \Sigma \otimes I$$

$$\Omega^{-1} = \Sigma^{-1} \otimes I$$

So, the estimation of regression coefficient could be found through:

$$\hat{\beta} = [X' \Omega^{-1} X]^{-1} X' \Omega^{-1} y.$$

In this estimation, iterating technique is employed to get the value converged. The convergence criteria (default) is .001.

Testing the significance of the restriction is accomplished by employing likelihood ratio (L) test, where:

$$L = -2(L_{\omega} - L_{\Omega}) \approx \chi_r^2.$$

RESULTS

The results of estimation are presented in the following tables. As a whole, one may look at the result of likelihood-ratio test where the restrictions are not rejected. This shows the fact that there is no different between the restricted system and the unrestricted one meaning that the variables under the restriction are not matter.

The interpretation of this finding is that moslem people are aware of the barakah content. They can feel the presence of barakah embedded in the good. This also confirm the assumption that moslem people reject the good with no barakah and accept the good which meets the criteria, that is, *halalan thayyiban*. The interested result in this respect is that the evidence shows that the coefficient of awareness-to-barakah is 0.99417 which is very close to unity which is practically the same as unity. This

TABLE 1. Result form Restricted system

VARIABLE'S NAME	COEFFICIENT	T-RATIO
USEFULNESS (U)	.56117	7.8028
INCOME	.6542	13.3390
MASLAHAH	2.9902	11.464
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION: -301.3957		

TABLE 2. Result from Unrestricted System

VARIABLE'S NAME	COEFFICIENT	T-RATIO
USEFULNESS (U_1)	.5543	5.1237
INCOME	0.6682	5.0165
MASLAHAH	3.0738	36.0500
BARAKAH	.99417	6.3501
RELATIVE PRICE	0.23938E-03	1.5337
USEFULNESS (U_2)	.5721	2.7435
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION: -299.1549		
CALCULATED LIKELIHOOD	LIKELIHOOD RATIO	
RATIO: 4.4816	BECHMARK (χ^2): 7.81473	

view gains support from the examination over the magnitude of d where the unity restriction is not rejected. This evidence shows that the degree of awareness is unity implying that Moslem people are fully aware of the presence of barakah. Moreover, the existence of cross-equation restriction shows that the knowledge over the product especially about the content of barakah does enter the buying equation. This finding uncover the fact that Moslem consumers make a serious and careful consideration over the magnitude of barakah in the good before deciding to purchase. This is to show that they are consistent of their awareness of the barakah content. Regarding the neutrality of relative price, the finding demonstrates that the relative price is, indeed, neutral. This is indicated by the neutrality restriction that is not rejected. This means that the elimination of the relative price from the system is not matter. This can also be observed from the significance of the variable where it has a quite low level of significance that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

To sum up, since the results shows that awareness, consistency and neutrality come together and simultaneously, it is safe to say that awareness implies consistency. While consistency further implies neutrality. This means that the revelation-deduction- based prediction over the relationship between awareness, consistency and neutrality meets reality. This shows that moslem consumers does aware of the existence and the extent of *barakah* in the product they are considering to buy. They also behave rationally in that they make a consistent buying decision based on their investigation. Finally, when seeing two goods with different *barakah* content they will find it easy to neglect the one with no barakah in it eventhough the price is lower. This further implies that the practice of

Islamic theory of consumption does exist, and therefore, about the accusation that Islamic economics is merely normative.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study is to produce a theoretical model implied by Islamic values which represents the behavior of Moslem consumer in choosing goods among alternatives. From empirical evidence, the results show that awareness, consistency and neutrality come together and simultaneously, it is safe to say that awareness implies consistency. While consistency further implies neutrality. This means that the revelation-deduction- based prediction over the relationship between awareness, consistency and neutrality meets reality. This shows that moslem consumers does aware of the existence and the extent of *barakah* in the product they are considering to buy. They also behave rationally in that they make a consistent buying decision based on their investigation. Finally, when seeing two goods with different *barakah* content they will find it easy to neglect the one with no *barakah* in it eventhough the price is lower. This further implies that the practice of Islamic theory of consumption does exist, and therefore, about the accusation that Islamic economics is merely normative.

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Munrokhim Misanam
Director of Graduate Program in Economics
Islamic University of Indonesia
Yogyakarta

